A plan for achieving success in Afghanistan

By Dr. Keith Martin MD, The Times Colonist - April 5, 2007

Iain Hunter's column "Afghanistan needs more than optimism" was a clarion call for us to rethink our most challenging international engagement.

He aptly recounted testimony I heard last week at Parliament's foreign affairs committee. There, our former ambassador to NATO, Gordon Smith, and New York University's Barnett Rubin explicitly expressed their full support for the excellent work our Canadian Forces troops are doing on the ground, but said that in order for the mission to be successful other elements must be put into place, and quickly.

The Senlis Council, the United States government, and some of our own front-line Canadian Forces members have come to similar conclusions.

Here are some of the challenges we are not hearing about and the solutions needed to address them:

- We are fighting an insurgency that has its bases outside the country we are fighting in. The Taliban and al-Qaeda receive their money, weapons, fighters and sanctuary in western Pakistan.

To make matters worse, several nations, including Iran, India and Pakistan, are meddling in the country's internal affairs. This means that unless these external influences are addressed, there will be war without end.

A UN regional working group on Afghanistan's security must be convened to bring these countries together in order to address their concerns and put a stop to their instigation of instability within the country.

- The Afghan National Police are poorly trained, poorly paid and poorly equipped. To survive, they have resorted to thuggish tactics against their own people. They are seen to be as much a problem on the ground as the Taliban.

Since most NATO members are not pulling their weight on the military side of the mission, they should vigorously engage in the building of a competent police force, judiciary and penal system. Without this, Afghans will not have security.

- Opium is the economic fuel for the Taliban and al-Qaeda. U.S.-led eradication of the poppies, which is the substrate for this illegal narcotic, has proven to be an unmitigated disaster. It has caused a rebound increase in production and, worst of all, has increased the risk to our troops due to farmers joining the Taliban as eradication wipes out their only source of income.

The opium should be redirected toward the production of legal, pharmaceutical grade narcotics. This would destroy the financial underpinnings of terrorist groups and give farmers, and the country, a value-added industry.

- The Taliban of 2007 is not the same Taliban that existed on 9/11. Today's group includes peasants who have been assaulted by coalition forces, groups that were excluded in the Bonn power-sharing agreement and disaffected peasants.

A Loya Jirga (National Grand Council) should be called by President Hamid Karzai that will give some of these marginalized groups a say in the future of their country.

- Aid must be increased in amount and effectiveness. Afghanistan is receiving one of the lowest per-capita investments of any international reconstruction effort in the last 30 years. Better oversight must be given to Karzai's government, which is widely seen to be corrupt.

Assistance should also be directed to smaller, on-the-ground non-governmental organizations that focus on basic needs: Primary health care, primary education, food security, water security and economic development. Our local commanders need small sums of cash they can use to contribute to small micro-projects on the ground.

This money would enable our troops to act quickly to resolve local economic needs they see on patrol and help to cement positive relationships with the local populace.

Also an investment in education and skills training, especially for the only university in Kandahar (where our troops are), will give Afghans the skills they need to work and integrate into society.

We went to Afghanistan after 9/11 as part of a UN-sanctioned mission to remove al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Now we are there to rebuild a tribal nation after decades of war so they can achieve some stability.

In the words of the UN special representative for Afghanistan, Chris Alexander, "this mission will take at least 10 to 20 years." Success now rests on the implementation of political solutions that, to date, have been neglected. We must do this to back up our troops and to enable the Afghan people to achieve the peace and security they richly deserve.